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Introduction	
 
The bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and the nine European Union countries examined in this 
policy brief – Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania – 
are characterised by the existence of large ethnic communities or “beached diasporas”.1 Many of 
these peoples came to be living in Kazakhstan as a result of Stalin’s expatriation policy in the 1930s-
40s. Others came later as ‘waves of settlers and migrant workers, mainly from the European parts of 
the former USSR, had transformed Kazakhstan into the most “international” of all the Soviet republics 
in the post-World War II period’.2 Yet, no matter how long they live in the host land, they self-identify 
with their own country of origin. They are, by Shain’s definition, diasporas: ‘geographically outside the 
state, but identity-wise perceived (by themselves, the homeland, or others) as “inside the people” – 
[they] attach great importance to kinship identity’.3  
 
Before the independence of Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries, direct contact between 
European countries and their ethnic communities was relatively minimal and, for the most part, 
discouraged. Independence and the change in the facility with which populations in different 
countries can communicate with each other have greatly transformed the nature of contact between 
member states and their diasporas in Kazakhstan and Central Asia generally.  
 
                                                            
 
1 Laitin, David D. 1995. “Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Nationality in the Post-Soviet Diaspora.” Archives 
Européenes de Sociologie, 36 (2): 281–316. Cohen’s typology suggests the term “victim diasporas” to cover much of the same 
experience (Cohen, Robin. 1997. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: UCL Press) 
2 Bhavna, Dave. 2004. “Entitlement through numbers: nationality and language categories in the first post-Soviet census of 
Kazakhstan.” Nations and Nationalism, 10 (4): 440. 
3 Shain, Yossi. 2007. Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 128. 
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As EU members, the nine states focused on are all equally open to trade with Kazakhstan and exercise 
similar financial, labour and tax regulation. Their diaspora communities – those that are citizens of 
Kazakhstan because of above mentioned historical circumstances – all enjoy equal rights under the 
Kazakhstan constitution though not all European diasporas have exercised them. All diasporas have 
equal rights to preserve and promote their language, culture and traditions (see Table 1: the European 
diasporas’ dynamic in Kazakhstan and Table 2: European diasporas in Kazakhstan and their cultural 
capital). 
 
Research Parameters  
 
In this policy brief, we discuss the 
European diasporas living in 
Kazakhstan in the context of European 
cultural diplomacy. The brief analyses 
their role and that of various 
specialised ethnic-cultural agencies in 
EU cultural diplomacy. It asks how the 
promotion of culture via diasporas can 
assist the EU in its cultural diplomacy. 
Finally, the brief evaluates the 
approaches of the EU member-states 
to their diasporas in creating interstate 
understanding and exchanging values. 
 
While the number of countries covered 
is relatively small, the analysis here draws on evidence of actual policy implementation rather than 
just official data. It also includes the activities of various national agencies.  
 
The research draws on responses to a questionnaire to the relevant embassies, semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of the diaspora communities as well as with current and former 
diplomats. The interviews were conducted between August and October 2016. Both members of the 
diasporas and diplomats were asked about the importance of engaging diasporas for the homeland's 
cultural diplomacy and projecting their country abroad. Respondents were invited to assess the 
interest of homeland governments and cultural institutions in working with diasporas, the level of 
homeland engagement in cultural activities locally and the impact local activities on the image of their 
country in Kazakhstan. Visits were made to thirteen ethnic-cultural centres in Karaganda, Pavlodar 
and Almaty – cities with compact diaspora populations, established by the government of Kazakhstan 
to support ethnic identities. In addition, an analysis of relevant social media (Facebook pages, 
websites, YouTube channels of cultural centres) and newspaper output (country-wide The Astana 
Times, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Dostyk) between April 2015 and July 2016 was undertaken. 
 
Following the usage in diaspora literature, the term “host land” is applied to the country of residence 
and “homeland” to the place of origin. 
 
To aid comparisons of state-diaspora relations, a typology from the perspective of a diaspora as a 
network of communication and facilitator of cultural diplomacy is advanced drawing on the level of 
formalisation of the state (homeland) relations with diasporas, and on the range of the “experience” 
Table 1: European diasporas’ dynamic in Kazakhstan. 
Source: National census of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The 
number of Romanian* and Finn** populations is given 
without taking into account closely-related ethnicities. 
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of the diasporic community. The relations between diaspora and homeland are explored from a broad 
range of immediate interactions, including the promotion of culture (music, language acquisition, film, 
festivals etc.), the facilitation of business opportunities, the encouragement of touristic exchange and 
the implementation of special cultural-educational programmes. The level of engagement ranged 
from highly formalised, in which quasi-state entities play an active role, to entirely informal, based on 
non-programmatic exchanges between civil society in the homeland and host country.  
 
The four categories of the diasporic networks are:  
1) Symbolic: covers diaspora that may have a high level of institutional recognition in terms 
of legal status or formal entitlement but whose advantages are not backed up by actual 
interaction.  The potential for cultural diplomatic advantage with groups in this category 
is not realised in part because the homeland agencies do not act. 
2) Nominal: refers to members of ethnic groups for whom no official provision is made and 
whose existence is effectively “formal” or even forgotten by the institutions. As part of a 
network of communication and facilitator of cultural diplomacy, this group is completely 
underutilised. 
3) Expressive: if diaspora is with broad lived experience and active in promoting of its culture 
within host state, but homeland’s governmental and non-governmental institutions 
responsible for their diaspora abroad fail in providing various forms of possible 
cooperation, the level of diaspora interaction is merely “expressive” 
4) Valued: it finds expression not only in formal arrangements but in a range of cultural 
events and enterprises that have regular meaning and value for all involved. In the valued 
cases, there is a ‘recognition that diasporas have an important place in the economic and 
political collaboration between countries of settlement and origin’ (Sinatti and Horst 2015, 
138) and this is reflected in proactivity. 
Diaspora Concentration                    
(in Kazakhstan) 
Cultural capital 
Greek  Cities of Kyzylorda 
and Pavlodar, South 
Kazakhstan and 
Dzhambyl oblast 
• 17 centres united by “Filiya” Greek Association in 
Kazakhstan  
• Before the crisis in Greece, the Association was 
supported with books & finances from Greece, was a 
period when the community published their own 
newspaper. 
• Dance group, music ensemble  
 
German 
  
Karaganda, Akmola, 
Pavlodar & 
Kostanai; until 
recently many 
German villages. 
• DAAD; GIZ; Goethe-Institut. 
• More than 20 cultural centres united by “Wiedergeburt" 
(Revival), the public association of Germans in 
Kazakhstan 
• German-language newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung  
• German Drama theatre  
• Various annual festivals 
• "German House" opened with the support of Govt. of 
Germany & Kz in 1994. Meeting place for intellectuals, 
businessmen, members of the Brussels club, 
politicians, trade unions etc.  
• http://www.wiedergeburt.kz/ 
Table 2: European diasporas in Kazakhstan and their cultural capital 
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• YouTube: daz.asia 
• https://www.facebook.com/daz.asia/  
  
Bulgarian Razumovka & 
Andriyanovka in 
today’s Pavlodar 
region & Bolgarka in 
today’s Aktobe 
region. 
• Zlata Bulgarian Ethno-Cultural Association of Astana, 5 
cultural centres 
• Tsvetanka children’s vocal band; Zlata adult band, Izvor 
dance group  
Polish North Kazakhstan, 
Karaganda & 
Pavlodar regions & 
cities of Astana & 
Almaty. 
• 80% of priests are from Poland 
• “Głos Polski” journal, Polish Union (1992) 
• Annual poetry competition “Kresy” in Pavlodar 
• Annual music festival “Singing Polonia." 
Finnish 
(inkerinsuomalaiset) 
Pavlodar, Almaty • "Suomi" ethnocultural centre (2002, Almaty) 
• 2016, new Finnish centre in Pavlodar with the focus on 
promoting language and culture 
 
Hungarian Almaty • Hungarian Cultural Centre, Almaty (1995)  
• Spassk Memorial in Karaganda oblast to Hungarians 
  
Lithuanian Karaganda 
  
• “Lituanica” public association 
• Meetings with Lithuania’s political leaders  
• Monument to Lithuanians, Steplag Gulag 
 
Romanian 2 villages in Aktobe: 
Bessarabka and 
Moldovanka 
• Dacia cultural society  
• Memorial of Spassk, Karaganda oblast 
• Meetings with Romanian  
• Karaganda State University: classes on culture and 
language 
• YouTube channel: dacia.kz 
 
Estonian North Kazakhstan, 
Marievka village 
There were several attempts to set up a cultural centre, 
however, lack of institutional support determined only ad 
hoc meetings of community members. 
 
 
Evidence and Analysis 
 
• ‘German, Lithuanian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian diasporas are the examples 
of “valued” communities with broad lived experience and being highly institutionalised 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Probably, the German diaspora is the model or ideal type of diaspora functioning successfully as a 
network of communication for cultural diplomacy. Partially, it is explained by the fact that Germans 
are the biggest European diaspora in Kazakhstan, constituting 1.1% of the whole population. After 
Kazakhstan gained its independence, Germany applauded the Kazakh government’s “Complex 
Programme of Ethnic Revival of Germans Living in the Republic of Kazakhstan”. Also, as an initial step 
to implement the programme, the Association of Germans and the Kazakh-German intergovernmental 
commission were established. 
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In order ‘to forestall any repeat of the migration of ethnic Germans and others from Kazakhstan’,4 
Germany creates many opportunities for Germans in Kazakhstan to feel support from their homeland. 
More than 20 branches of the ethnocultural association Wiedergeburt (Revival) have been established 
throughout Kazakhstan; also the functioning of the Goethe Institut, the German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD), the Kazakhstan-Germany Institute, a German drama theatre and radio station, as well as 
a German language newspaper, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, are supported and facilitated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Office of 
Administration and by the German Technical Cooperation Agency in Almaty. The latter coordinates 
the implementation of the various German programmes in Kazakhstan.5 
 
The German diaspora in Kazakhstan displays a vibrant and organised lived experience, and the 
institutional supports available are wide-ranging and highly impactful. The German community is very 
active in discussions on developing legislation protecting national minorities’ rights (1998); national policy; 
Kazakh-German cultural and economic relations and humanitarian cooperation; the adoption of a European 
model of social support; and cultural heritage in Kazakhstan. Taking into account the well-organised 
structure of the community, its close relations with the homeland, active position of the diaspora in 
the social life of the host land and the economic and political weight of Germany, the German diasporic 
community could be a significant player not only in Kazakhstan, but in Central Asia as well.6 
 
At the same time, no less valued, in spite of the lack of specialised agreements between the countries, 
are the diasporas from Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Each makes a significant contribution 
to bilateral relations alongside preserving and promoting ethnic culture. For example, during her 
official visit, the President Dalia Grybauskaitė made it clear that Lithuanians in Kazakhstan are also 
part of Lithuania: ‘Let's remain Lithuanians wherever we are. Show respect for the country you live in 
but don't forget your Motherland’.7 
 
                                                            
 
4 Brown, Andrew J. 2005. “The Germans of Germany and the Germans of Kazakhstan: A Eurasian Volk in the Twilight of 
Diaspora.” Europe-Asia Studies, 57 (4): 631. 
5 Sheryazdanova, K. and D. Smagulova. 2012. “Migration and Diaspora Aspects of the Kazakh-German Relations.” Eurasian 
Economic Integration, 1 (14).  
6 Brown. 2005, p.  625. 
7 Grybauskaitė, Dalia. 2011. Speech quoted in “Perpetuation of the memory of Lithuanian exiles in Kazakhstan.” Accessed 7 
October 2016. https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/12277  
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The ethnocultural centres act as "cultural ambassadors", promoting national and European values 
through music, dance, theatre performances, exhibitions and public lectures. They regularly involve 
the wider community beyond the diasporas. The German, Lithuanian, Bulgarian and Romanian 
diasporas cooperate with schools and universities on the promotion of language, literature and 
culture. Their centres also facilitate engagement between embassies and diaspora communities to 
promote cultural, educational and business 
projects and partnerships. Further, the centres 
are the focus of events that unite the whole 
diaspora, including international events that 
link communities across the globe. For 
instance, the Congress of Romanians 
Everywhere, the World Congress of Pontian 
Greeks, the Congress of the Lithuanian World 
Community and similar organisations work 
through the ethnic community centres. The 
attention the diasporas and corresponding 
ethnic centres receives from their 
Governments is explained by national cultural 
diplomacy shift toward ‘second generation 
known as active creation, which encompasses 
non-state actors in order to strengthen it 
[cultural diplomacy] not only with their closer 
or wider neighbours, but also to promote it in 
overseas countries’, where ‘national diaspora 
(associations) serve as the pull factor for the 
materialisation of Slavic EU Member States’ 
cultural diplomacy’.8   
 
In the case study drawn on here, the size of the diaspora was not a good predictor of their place in the 
typology. Currently, there are around 400 Hungarians scattered all over Kazakhstan, among them 50 live 
in Almaty, where the ethnocultural centre was set up in 1996 ‘to further the revival and development 
of Hungarian national culture, to preserve customs and practices of Hungarian people’.9 
Notwithstanding their small number, the centre has close contacts with senior officials from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy. It also hosted several meetings with the President of 
Hungary. The centre is active in disseminating knowledge about Hungarian culture and achievements 
on the various media platforms of Kazakhstan. As with others, the Hungarian centre provides cultural 
and educational opportunities for Kazakhstani people visiting Hungary. The centre also participated 
actively in establishing a memorial to Hungarian prisoners in SpasskLAG (Karaganda oblast) and 
facilitates business relations between the two countries.10 Moreover, cultural relations are supported 
via the Hungarian Turan Foundation, an organisation that unites nomadic peoples. 
 
• Polish and Greek Diasporas: from being ‘expressive’ to ‘valued’ and back 
 
The Polish and Greek diasporas are examples that demonstrate the possibility of changing the status 
of a network. The attitude of these homelands toward their diasporas has shifted – the Greek from 
being “valued” toward “expressive”, and the Polish vice versa. In the case of Greece, in the post-2008 
economic crisis, institutional supports have been downgraded and poorly funded. Currently, in spite 
of low institutional framework, the lived experience of the Greek community is not shrinking: the 
cultural activities are holding mostly with the support of local akimats (a municipal, district, or 
                                                            
 
8 Udovič & Podgornik. 2016. “Cultural Diplomacy of Slavic European Union Member States: A Cross-country Analysis”. Baltic 
Journal of European Studies 6 (2): 130-133 
9 “Не количеством, но качеством” Dostyq, 6 May 2013. Accessed 25 October 2016. Available at 
http://dostykmag.kz/?p=205 
10 Ibid. 
Figure 1: Networks of communication - based 
on the case of Kazakhstan 
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provincial government) via various grants and the enthusiasm of members, who still cherish 
theatrical, dancing, musical and other cultural initiatives. They are clearly eager to foster their Greek 
identity and are supported in this endeavour by the World Council of Greeks Abroad, an organisation 
that is active only in the former USSR region. 
 
Poland, in turn, has started giving more consideration to its diaspora abroad. In 1999, Kazakhstan and 
Poland put on the agenda of bilateral cooperation the possibility of sending to Kazakhstan Polish 
language and culture teachers, of opening a Kazakh-Polish university and of broadcasting Polish TV 
channel Polonia, all listed on the Kazakh Government website. 
 
However, the initiatives were implemented only in 2013 and ultimately confirmed in 2016. The 
agreement to improve cultural and educational ties between countries made it possible for Poland to 
send to Kazakhstan Polish language teachers and to accept in return children from the diaspora 
during their summer and winter vacations to study language and culture. Special programmes also 
exist for older people. From 2008, Poland started granting Karta Polyaka (Pole's Card), which gives 
cultural-educational benefits to its holders, such as free visas, free admission to museums, transport 
discounts and other benefits. Recently, at the University of International Business in Almaty, with the 
support of the Polish embassy and the Polish Association, the first Kazakhstan-Poland educational 
centre has been opened. Although the institutional framework was weak initially, Polish people are 
notable for the robust protection of their identity, even in cases of mixed marriage. This characteristic 
and personal enthusiasm of the Polish facilitated the establishment of ethnocultural centres, the 
organisation of festivals of Polish songs and close contacts with Polish musicians and artists. But, 
the assistance from the Polish government in recent years for both ‘repatriation'11 and cultural 
revival12 has encouraged a broad lived experience for the Polish diaspora. 
 
• Finnish diaspora: example of an ‘expressive’ community 
 
The Finnish diaspora in Kazakhstan is categorised here as "expressive" because of its renewed vitality, 
but the homeland institutions scarcely acknowledge it. Indeed, the existence of a diaspora in 
Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia is officially denied. This status is much to the frustration 
of Kazakhstan's ethnic community. Finns, including Karelians and Ingrians, were deported to 
Kazakhstan from Leningrad oblast between 1935 and the 1940s. From the 17th century onward, this 
ethnic group was the victim of religious and political conflicts and territorial annexation involving 
Finland, Sweden and Russia. For simplicity and following Kazakhstan usage, the term “Finn” is used 
to cover the community in this analysis.13 Today, contact between the Finns and their "homeland" is 
almost entirely non-governmental though Almaty and Helsinki are "twinned" and there is a Finnish 
Business Centre in Astana.  The Finnish diaspora participated in the VII World Congress of the Finno-
Ugrian Peoples after pressure from the aspiring delegate from Kazakhstan. Currently, there are two 
ethnocultural centres: one in Almaty with a focus on expanding business relations, and the second 
one in Pavlodar, where culture, history and language are at the core of the activities. 
 
• Estonian diaspora as a ‘nominal’ community 
 
The Estonian diaspora as a network of communication is considered to be “nominal”. This is perhaps 
not surprising given the narrow focus of Estonian foreign policy.14 According to the official statistics, 
the number of Estonians is close to 1,000, with a big concentration in the Northern Kazakhstan village 
                                                            
 
11 Iglicka, Krystyna. 2002. “Poland: Between Geopolitical Shifts and Emerging Migratory Patterns.” Working Paper for Prage 
Migracyine Seria, 42. Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, p. 15 
12 Astana Times, 14 January 2015. 
13 Mähönen, Tuuli Anna, Sirkku Varjonen, Nicholas Prindiville, Linda Arnold, and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti. 2015 “Boundaries of 
National Belonging in Ingrian Finish Return Migration: A Multi-Level Perspective.” Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 5 (3): 
126. 
14 Raik, Kristi. 2014. “Renaissance of realism, a new stage of Europeanization, or both? Estonia, Finland and EU foreign 
policy.” Cooperation and Conflict, 50 (4): 440-456. 
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of Marievka. The evidence gathered for this case study suggests, however, that the Estonian 
ethnocultural centre is non-functioning. According to Oinas,15 there were two attempts to set up an 
Estonian cultural centre, however, the efforts were unsuccessful due to a lack of institutional support 
and resources. At the moment, the activities of Estonians are reduced to a joint celebration of 
significant Estonian dates. As Kulu suggests, the official Estonian approach may reflect ambiguities 
in the wider nation-building project: “Estonia supports the members of the diaspora both in their 
country of residence and returning to their “historical homeland”.16 However, support is comparatively 
modest; the policy is less clear. 
 
The case of Estonia is a reminder that the relationship with the diaspora is for all homelands subject 
to domestic political pressure. 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
Engagement with diaspora communities is a growing feature of cultural diplomacy globally. 
Successful policies can engender levels of trust that help to consolidate positive bilateral relations 
and ameliorate the impact of policy differences. For EU member states, the decision to enhance their 
links with residents abroad whose cultural roots are shared will help consolidate European influence. 
In many cases, it will assist social and economic development in countries that seek to emulate 
European cultural values. While all member states appear to see the value of engaging their diaspora, 
some have chosen to tailor their cultural diplomacy to their domestic economic pressures or their 
wider global strategy. 
 
The examination of the cultural diplomacy of European Union member states in Kazakhstan has 
stressed the benefits of developing vibrant “valued” networks of communication embracing both local 
diasporas and homeland embassies and agencies. In such cases, diplomatic benefits accrue to the 
homeland and local communities are empowered. Similarly, failing to capitalise on positive sentiment 
with some infrastructural support may leave an “expressive” network as one of neglected potential. 
Recommendations: Improving the Use of Diaspora in Kazakhstan 
 
Based on the interviews with the directors of the ethnocultural centres, the recommendations are the 
following : 
 
• To recognise the wide variety of people who make up the diaspora and the important 
contribution that they have been making in preserving and promoting culture and identuty; 
• In order to avoid the ‘folklorisation' phenomena, to send an update studying literature on the 
frequent basis 
• To establish closer links with non-state organisations in the countries of origin 
• To set up a particular policy or establish an intergovernmental commission that provides an 
agenda for bilateral cooperation 
• To participate in the events organised by the ethnocultural centres 
• To consult with diaspora on potential areas of collaboration with hostland 
• To facilitate a wide range of activities organised by and for  the diaspora in both directions - 
homeland and hostland – in order to build on and develop two-way diaspora engagement 
• To provide scholarship opportunities in both the host land and homeland 
• To encourage family reunions 
                                                            
 
15  Oinas, Maria. 2005. Эстонская диаспора Казахстана: историко-социальный аспект, (Estonian diaspora in Kazakhstan: 
historical and social aspect).” Master’s thesis, Almaty: Kaynar University. 
16  Kulu, Hill. 2000. “Policy towards the Diaspora and Ethnic (Return) Migration: An Estonian case.” GeoJournal, 51 (3): 135-
143. 
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